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This paper analyzes if unemployment can be reduced through labor tax cuts that are
financed in a revenue neutral way through energy tax increases. In contrast to other
papers on this topic we consider investment behavior of firms in energy saving
technologies, irreversibilities, embodied technological progress and involuntary
unemployment. Arguments are presented that reducing the sunk costs instead of the
labor tax seems to be the better instrument to reduce energy input and unemployment
since this puts more pressure on firms that are using old technologies to adopt a more
efficient energy saving technology.
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Uppercase Roman letters
A(t) output of a production unit; represents also the technology that was the
leading technology at time t
B constant technology parameter
C updating cost for a production unit
E(t) energy demand of the economy
E(t) energy demand of a production unit
H number of hires
/ installation cost for energy saving technology
J value of a job to a firm
K setup cost for a new production unit
L labor force
Q(t) output of the economy
S social surplus that is generated by a match between a worker and a firm
T scrapping age of an old technology
Tj destruction age of an old production unit
T; age, when old production unit is updated with latest technology
U value of unemployment to a worker
W value of a job to a worker
Lowercase Roman letters
a age of a production unit
cn constante Euler'se
/ cross section density of production units
g growth rate of technological progress , equal to steady state growth rate of
energy price
g government expenditure deflated with the growth rate of technological
progress
k number of events in a Poisson distribution
in arrival parameter of a Poisson distribution that gives the probability that an
unemployed worker finds a job
n number of times that an old production unit has been updated
q arrival parameter of a Poisson distribution that gives the probability that a
vacant job is filled with a worker
r interest rate
.v index for time
r time
u unemployment rate
v rate of vacant jobs
w wage
x ratio of hired to unemployed workers
Greek letters
P bargaining power of the worker
P short writing for j-5 arrival parameter of a Poisson distribution that gives the probability that a
production unit is destroyed by an exogenous shock
X arrival parameter of Poisson distribution
7t Poisson distribution
u.(/) energy saving technology installed at date r
o elasticity of energy demand with respect to energy saving technology
t; labor tax reate
 ;
xE energy tax rate
0 ratio of vacant jobs to unemployed workers1. Introduction
Is it possible to improve environmental quality and. at the same time, reduce
unemployment with an environmental tax reform? This is the hope of the supporters of
an environmental tax reform. Since raising a tax on polluting activities creates income
for the government, the government has the possibility to lower other taxes. Therefore,
given the political importance of the unemployment problem, it is quite natural to ask
whether this additional income can be used to create better conditions for the
production factor labor. In Germany the public and academic debate focuses on the
question whether it is possible to reduce "unemployment through adjusted cuts in firms
contribution to social insurances that work like a tax on labor. This paper tries to
analyze if unemployment can be reduced through labor tax cuts that are financed in a
revenue neutral way through energy tax increases.
Ecological tax reforms that improve next to environmental quality also a second
welfare indicator are said to yield a double dividend. The double dividend gains
importance once it is realized that the magnitude of environmental benefits is largely
unknown due to missing markets for environmental quality (See Goulder (1995)).
Since raising an environmental tax might cause costs in form of the reduction of other
welfare indicators there is no guarantee that the environmental benefits outweigh the
economic cost it creates. Therefore, the net welfare effect of an environmental tax
reform might be negative even if environmental quality is improved. Therefore, in
order to guarantee positive net welfare effects, an environmental tax reform must yield
a double dividend. Then there is also no need for a country to coordinate its policy
with other countries, since the welfare benefits of the environmental tax reform are
guaranteed to supersede the cost.
The question of environmental tax reforms and employment has been addressed in a
number of papers. In Bovenberg, de Mooij (1994), and Bovenberg, van der Ploeg
(1994) employment always decreases in a revenue neutral environmental tax reformthat raises an environmental tax and reduces the tax on labor in exchange. Koskela,
Schob (1996) analyze a revenue neutral environmental tax reform and its
consequences on unemployment. However, in these papers pollution is caused by
households and not by a production sector, as is more common in many cases.
Bovenberg, de Mooij (1995) and Bovenberg, van der Ploeg (1995) analyze
environmental tax reforms in a framework where pollution is caused by the supply side
of the economy. A shortcoming of these papers is that investment behavior of firms in
energy saving technologies is completely neglected, although an increasing number of
studies [see e.g. Enquete Kommission des Deutschen Bundestages zum ,,Schutz der
Erdatmosphare" (1995), Frisch (1991), or Kreuzberg (1996)] point at the important
relationship between a firm's energy demand and its investment in energy saving
technologies. Especially, Klodt (1994) found that industrial energy saving in West
Germany after the oil price shocks was mainly achieved by improved technology and
not by structural shifts. Another extreme assumption of the mentioned papers is that
investment behavior of firms is a reversible decision. Physical capital can be costlessly
shifted from one application to another. In many cases this is unrealistic. Typically
investments are irreversible. Once physical capital is locked into an application it
cannot be costlessly shifted to another application. This has important consequences
for the effects of an environmental tax reform. Once an investment into a new
technology has occurred a firm is unable to reduce its energy input. In order to
significantly change energy input the firm has to invest into new, more energy efficient
technology. But since an investment is connected to sunk costs a firm might consider it
optimal not to react to a price change right away, since reaction means new sunk costs,
which might supersede the gains from an investment. On the other hand an installed
capital unit or technology is not used for an infinite time. Due to technological progress
and depreciation there is a continuous process of sorting out technologies that are
relatively unproductive and hence, cannot pay equilibrium factor prices. Therefore,
there comes the day for every production unit when it is too far away from the
productivity frontier. Then it has to be decided whether this production unit is updated
7with the latest technology and new sunk costs are incurred or whether updating is too
expensive and it is decided to scrap the production unit. The irreversibility of the
investment decision and the ensuing sunk costs play a decisive role for unemployment
in our model. Following Caballero, Hammour (1994, 1996) the assumption that capital
cannot be shifted cosllessly between applications gives rise to a bilateral bargaining
situation between firm and worker that raises the wage above its efficient level and is
responsible for unemployment.
Regarding the updating decision of production units, modern economic theory
distinguishes two points of view. In schumpeterian theories technological progress is
destructive. The arrival of a new technology destroys ah old production unit, but
creates a new one. According to this view it is too expensive to update an old
production unit with the latest technology. As a consequence technological progress
leads to a permanent reallocation of labor. Based on empirical evidence by Davis,
Haltiwanger (1990) recent papers of Aghion, Howitt (1994), Caballero, Hammour
(1994), and Mortensen, Pissarides (1995) introduce a friction in form of a labor
matching function into this process of labor reallocation, such that the process of
creative destruction leads to unemployment. Mortensen, Pissarides (1995) also point
at another popular view of technological progress in modern economic theory.
Solovian or neoclassical technological progress does not lead to creative destruction,
because existing production units are continually updated with the latest technology.
This is only possible if the updating cost is sufficiently small. As a consequence of this
assumption technological progress does not lead to labor reallocation and
technological progress does not have this negative consequence for unemployment.
The aspect of whether to update or not to update existing production units with the
latest technology and the significance of sunk costs is an important characteristic of
investment decisions that has to be considered by environmental policymakers, who
want to use environmental tax reforms to fight unemployment. Environmental policy
From a theoretical point of view these models are ;in extension of Pissarides (1990).has the aim to reduce the energy input of firms and to induce an investment decision of
firms into energy saving technologies. Investment into energy saving technologies
increases the sunk cost that arises, when a new job is created or updated. .Therefore,
environmental policy has important consequences for the firm decision to create a new
job and to update old jobs. In this paper, we concentrate on: the effects of an
environmental tax reform under explicit consideration of the investment decision of
firms. The environmental tax reform is modeled as raising the energy tax.and an
adjusted change of a labor tax so that the government budget is balanced. We consider
two benchmark models that follow from the prevailing division :of technological
progress in economic theory in schumpeterian and neoclassical technological progress.
This affects the investment decision of firms and the level of unemployment.
In this paper it is shown that a revenue neutral environmental tax reform that uses the
additional revenue resulting from an increase of the energy tax to cut down the labor
tax can possibly reduce unemployment if the cost of updating old jobs with a new
technology is sufficiently low and the tax on labor is. not too high. The environmental
tax reform achieves the opposite if the updating cost is too high, because in this case
the environmental tax reform will lead to job destruction. Therefore, reducing the labor
tax in exchange for raising the energy tax might not have the desired effects. Also we
find in numerical examples that the effects of environmental tax reforms as described
above on unemployment turn out to be small. We draw the conclusion that if the
government wants firms to change their production technology and at the same time
increase employment the government might do better if it facilitates the
implementation of new technologies for firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we introduce the structure of
the economy. In section 3 we introduce the first benchmark model with schumpeterian
technological progress. It is assumed that the cost of updating old technologies is too
high such that a firm always exits from the market when it is too far away from the
productivity frontier and hence, unable to pay the equilibrium factor prices. Then weanalyze the effects of tax changes and of a revenue neutral environmental tax reform. It
is shownthat policy makers cannot expect to reap a double dividend when the revenue
from an energy tax increase is used to cut the labor tax. The proposed environmental
tax reform leads to more unemployment since the rents from creating jobs are
diminished. In section 4 we introduce our second benchmark model with neoclassical
technological progress. The updating cost is sufficiently low such that technological
progress does not lead to job destruction. In this case the government can possibly
reap a double dividend. In all models only steady states are compared and the
transitional dynamics are completely neglected.In section 5 weanalyze possible short
term effects of an environmental tax reform. Section 6 concludes.
2. The economy
The small open economy trades two goods with the rest of the world at world market
prices: a produced good whose aggregate output at time t is Q(t), and energy.
Consequently, the prices of energy and the aggregate output are exogenous. The
productive structure is made up of many production units that combine in fixed
proportions a unit of labor and an efficiency unit of energy. Exogenous technological
progress is embodied in production units and drives the continuous process of their
creation and destruction. A production unit that was created or updated at time t
produces A{t) units of output. A(t) represents also the technology that was the leading
technology at time t. It is assumed that the leading technology grows at the exogenous
rate g > 0, which is also the steady state growth rate of the model.
The efficiency unit of energy is related to the installed energy saving technology \i(t)
in the following way: E(t + s)*—— = 1, where E(t) denotes energy demand of a
B
production unit, -o < 0 denotes the elasticity of energy demand with respect to energy
saving technology and B denotes a constant technology parameter and where s lies
between zero and the scrapping age, T, i.e. 0<.v<7\ We assume that a firm can
10choose \i(t) from a set of energy saving technologies. The set of energy saving
technologies is a public good, i.e. the choice of \i(t) is free, but the firms pay for the
installation of y,(t). The larger |i(0 the lower the energy demand E(t) of a production
unit. Energy demand of a production unit that was created or updated at time t can be
written as E(t + s) = Bu(f)"°. Note that E^(t) <0, Efiti(t)>0, i.e. the marginal energy
savings of an additional unit jj.(O are always positive but decreasing.
From these assumptions it follows that new production units hav a higer labor
productivity and energy productivity than production units from an older vintage.
Schurr et al. (1990) presents empirical evidence for the US economy that justifies
these assumptions. Especially, Schurr et al. (1990) show that times of high labor
productivity increases were also times of high energy productivity increases. Varying
over time is the ratio of energy input per unit of labor. This feature is captured in the
endogenous choice of \i{t).
Creating a production unit is costly. The creation cost consists of two parts. First, a
firm that creates a production unit has to pay a setup cost KA(t) that is paid when the
worker arrives. The second part is the installation cost for the energy saving
technology, A(t)I(\i(t)). It is assumed that in steady state creation costs grow over
time at the rate of technological progress. This assumption is necessary assure the
existence of a steady state. The creation cost deflated with the rate of technological
progress is I(\i(t))+K. The term /(|x(f)) describes the relationship between the energy
saving technology \x{t) and the deflated creation cost. We assume that 1^ (|i(0) > 0
and 7^(11(0)^0. Note that the assumptions about 7^(^(0), 7|i(1((0.(t)), £M(0, and
Em{t) imply that energy can be substituted through capital, but that the lower the
energy demand, i.e. the higher |i(0, the more difficult it is to substitute energy through
capital.
Note that due to the endogenous choice of \l(t) aggregate capital intensity is an endogenous variable, too, if we
consider the aggresate net of energy output as a function of labor and physical capital.
11Each production unit employs one worker. Therefore, the number of production units
gives the number of employed workers. Production units were created at different
times and, thus, also have different productivities. New technologies emerge
continually and each technology eventually reaches its scrapping age T when it will be
put into obsolescence, hence, a vintage of technology at any time / can be described by
its age a, that will range between 0 and T. The cross section density of production
units aged a at date / is
f(a,t), 0<a<T(t)
Therefore, with a fixed and normalized labor force L=J, employment can be given as
the difference between labor force L and unemployed uL: Keeping in mind that each
production unit employs only one worker, we have








A firm is engaged in a labor market matching process. At each unit of time H matches
take place or equivalently, H workers are hired from the unemployment pool. The
number of matches or hires H is a linearly homogenous function of the number of
unemployed uL and of the number of vacancies vL, H = m(uL; vL). In addition the
function m is concave and increasing in both arguments. The fraction of vacant jobs
that is filled in a unit of time is therefore o(9) = —'•—- =
 :—, with 9 = V/M.
• vL 9
Therefore, the process that changes the state of a vacant job can be expressed as a
stochastic Poisson process. The Poisson distribution is defined as
n(k;ktn) = e~




vacant job) takes place k times in a time interval [0;t0]. The probability that a certain
event occurs exactly 0 times in [0;t0] is
: p(O;Xto) = e~
h<'. Therefore, the probability
that an event occurs at least once in [0; 10 ] is 1 - e'
}J° = J'° Xe'
hdt. The parameter X is
called the arrival parameter and gives the expected number of events that take place in
the unit time interval [0,1]. Therefore, m(8;l) and c/(8) can be interpreted as arrival
parameters of a Poisson distribution.
As will be shown in detail, for firm will arrive at the date where it has to decide
whether to update an existing production unit with a new technology or to let the
production unit turn obsolete such that the incumbent worker has to get fired. Similar
to Mortensen, Pissarides (1995) it is assumed that the decision of whether to update or
not depends on the updating cost A(t)[l(\i(t)) + C], In the first model we assume that
technological'progress is schumpeterian. Technological progress is destructive, such
that each production unit is only on the market for a finite time, Due to technological
progress it will shift further and further away from the productivity frontier such that it
is eventually not profitable anymore. Once a production unit is unprofitable it will be
destroyed. Therefore, schumpeterian technological progress implies that the updating
cost C is so high that firms will never update old production units. Inahis case
technological progress implies also a permanent reallocation of labor and the scrapping
age T does not denote only the scrapping of the technology in use, but also the
destruction of the whole production unit. In section 4 we assume the other, extreme
case that technological progress does not imply reallocation of labor. This implies that
the updating cost C is so low that all firms choose to update existing production units,
with the latest technology. In this case T denotes the scrapping of the old technology in
use and the implementation of a new technology. The main difference between section
3 and 4 is that we assume in section 3 that the updating cost is always higher than the
setup cost and vice versa in section 4. This difference in assumptions makes sense if
schumpeterian technological progress is understood in form of new products. In this
case it seems easy to imagine that the updating cost might higher than the setup cost of
13a .new production unit. In the neoclassical case technological progress is best
understood in form of product or process improvements. Then it seems plausible to
assume that the updating cost lies below the setup cost of a new production unit.
3. The decentralized economy with creative destruction in the long run'
In this section we assume schumpeterian technological progress and thus, that the
updating cost C is so high that firms will never update old production units. The
variable 7' denotes destruction of a production unit and is therefore marked with the
subscript d.
3.1. The firm
The firm can be in one of two states: idle or producing. In the idle state the firm has to
decide whether to remain idle or to create a vacancy and to employ a worker. If the
firm decides to create a vacancy it also has to decide which technology to install that it
will use until the production unit is destroyed. Regarding the technology choice the
firm has to choose the productivity level and the level of energy consumption. Profit
maximization will lead every firm that creates a job to choose the highest productivity
level currently available. The choice of energy consumption depends on the energy
saving technology. Here the firm has to consider the investment cost and the benefits
that occur from the energy saving technology in form of a smaller energy cost. In the
active state the firm is producing, and in each period deciding whether to continue
producing or scrap the production unit and go into the idle state.
The expected value of creating a production unit at date / to a fmn equals the expected
value of r> producing production unit minus the expected cost that it takes to setup the
production unit
(1) V(t)=maxj;q(Q{S))[j(s;O;li(s)) - A(s)(K + l^s^y^^^ ds
14where s denotes a time index. 7(.v;0;n(.v)) denotes the value of a job that has the age
a-0 at date t.
The value of a vacancy equals the expected value of a filled job minus the expected




the discounted value of a filled job multiplied with the probability that the job is filled.
The expression £° q(Q(s))A(s)(K + I(\i(s)))e '
 6 * ds gives the expected present
value of the cost to setup the production unit. From equation (1) it becomes clear that
the setup cost must be paid when the worker is found who is going to occupy the
production unit. This is expressed through c/(8) in (1). Assuming free entry of firms, in
equilibrium the value of a vacant job must be zero, hence for date t the following
equilibrium conditions must hold
(2) J(t; i ]
(3) Jil{t i
The value of a filled job with age a is
J(f;a;H(0) = max\
T'\A(t) - (l + T E) p(s)
(4)
 7* "
Equation (4) says that the value of a job with age a that was opened at date t equals
the discounted sum of expected profits. Profit in period .v equals output that was
produced with a technology that was installed at time t, A(t), minus expenditure for
energy, (l +xE)p{s)B\x(t)~", and labor, (l + xL)w{t;s;[i(t)). xE and x, denote the tax
rates on energy and labor, respectively. Note that energy expenditure of a firm in
period s depends on the energy saving technology that was installed at time t and the
producer price of energy for period s. As is shown below the wage w(t;s;\i(t))
In our model search costs of Lhe firm are completely neglected. Caballero, Hammour (1994), p. 5 argue ,,that
shifting the emphasis to specific investment costs [...] is a more promising avenue in providing satisfactory
interpretation of the facts."
15depends on the chosen energy saving technology u.(r) and the date t at which the job
was equipped with \i(t) and the latest production technology. With the choice of T the
firm determines the exit age for the technology in use, which is finite as we will
demonstrate below.
In order to assure the existence of a steady state we have to make the assumption
p(s) = pe
s('~'^A(t), i.e. the world market energy price grows at the rate steady state
growth rate g. This assumption does not influence the main results of this model and is
needed to ensure the existence of a steady state. If the energy price remained constant
technological progress would let the share of energy in firm expenditure converge to
zero and the incentive to save energy would vanish.
The optimization problem of the firm is solved as follows: First the exit age is
determined, given the energy saving technology |j.(f). From (4) follows
(5) A(t) - (1 + ( (
This exit condition states that the firm chooses to exit the market and join the idle
state, if the cash flow for the firm equals zero.
The technology \i(t) is chosen according to equation (3). From (3) and (4) follows the
first order condition for the choice of u.(0 •
(6)
This condition states that the optimal investment level in energy saving technology is
achieved, when the marginal investment cost equals the marginal sum of expected and
discounted return from this investment. As will be shown below, the wage depends on
the choice of \i(t).
In the next section we briefly describe the worker and the Nash bargaining process
between a worker and a firm. For a more detailed description the reader is referred to
Pissarides (1990) and Mortensen, Pissarides (1995).
163.2. The worker
The value of a job to a worker is






a)cjs describes the expected discounted sum of wage
payments from a match that was created at time / and equipped with technology |a(/).
The term e~
Ms~
n) captures the probability that the match is not destroyed. The second
term, J




0)rfA\ describes the value of unemployment, where 8e"
8(lw"
captures the probabilty of remaining unemployed.
The value of being unemployed equals
(8) f/(f + a) = £m(i;e
We assume that there is no value of leisure or unemployment transfer so that the only
benefit of unemployment is derived from the prospect of finding a new job.
3.3. Wage bargaining
Wages are determined in a Nash bargaining process between firms and workers. The
Nash product to be maximized is
maxJ{tt*{W(t)-U(t)f s.t S{t)= J(t)+W{t)
P denotes the bargaining power of the worker and 1 -13 the bargaining power of the
firm. Additionally it is assumed that 0 < (3 < 1. S(t) denotes the surplus that is
generated from a match between a worker and a firm. From Nash bargaining results
(9) (1 - PX W(f; a) - U(t + a)) = p/(r; a)
Differentiation with respect to age a gives
17From this last equation and equations (4)-(9) we can derive the following wage'
equation as is shown in appendix A




M\; 9(0)y(f + a;0; \i(t + a))
The wage at date t+a of a worker that works with a technology that was leading at
date t consists of a share of the cash flow his job generates plus the opportunity cost
that the worker faces when he stays with the technology that is not up to date at date
t+a. The opportunity cost is the same for all employed workers and does not depend
on the age of their job. The share, however, that they receive from their current match
depends on the age of their job and due to technological progress older technologies
create a smaller surplus than new technologies.The opportunity cost equals the share
that the worker would get at the most modern job multiplied with the probability to get
matched with the new technology. This wage equation shows that also the wage of old
technologies profit from technological progress since the outside option, that is the
wage that the worker would receive at a new production unit, grows at the rate of
technological progress. If the wage of an old production unit would not grow, the
worker would be better off quitting his job join the unemployment pool and look for a
new job that pays a higher wage. The opportunity cost does not depend on
technological progress alone. The term m(\;Q(t)) captures the current labor market
situation. The longer the worker has to expect to stay unemployed if he quits his job,
the lower his opportunity cost to stay with the old technology. It can also be seen that
the most modern technologies pay the highest wage and the oldest technologies pay
the lowest wage.
Only the cost of sliifting capital from one application to another, which is infinite in our
model, gives bargaining power to the worker which allows him to set the wage above
the efficient level. Unemployment has now the role to limit the bargaining power of the
18worker by reducing his threat point U(t), since m(\;Q(t)) equals the ratio of hires and
unemployment.
3.4. The steady state equilibrium
Inserting the wage equation (10) into (4) and making use of the exit condition (5) gives
the following entry condition
(11)
where P(x/) summarizes |1(T£) = ) ^-, p'>0. Equation (11) is also derived in
(1+PTJ.
appendix B.
Since in a steady state equilibrium the variables 0 and |i.(() have to remain constant,
J(t + a;Q; u(f + a)) J(t;O; u.(f))
we can conclude from (2) that in steady state J = = is
A(t + a) A(t)
constant in steady state. Therefore, from (11) and (2) we can derive the following
steady state entry condition
(12) J = f [(l - p(t,)
with/=[*:+/(|l)]
4 4
hi appendix B we show how to derive the following equation from (6) and (10), which
gives the first order condition for technology choice
(13) /M(n) =
This condition states that the optimal investment level in energy saving technology is
achieved, when the marginal investment cost equals the marginal sum of expected and
discounted return from this investment. The return from the investment equals the cost
Since we deal with steady stale equilibria, where the endogenous variables are the same for all vintages, we drop
the variable /.
19savings due to the energy saving technology multiplied with the share that the firm
receives from the match with the worker. Since the firm has to carry the investment
cost alone there occurs a distortion in the optimal choice of energy saving technology.
This distortion results from the fact that the worker benefits from the investment in
energy saving, technology in form of an increased cash flow, but does not participate in
the increased investment cost. Therefore, the investment decision is distorted since
actually the marginal match surplus should equal the marginal investment cost, but
only the marginal benefit that occurs to the firm is equalized with the marginal
investment cost. Hence, investment in energy saving technology is too low compared
to the socially optimal level. This distortion results from the positive externality of the
investment decision on the wage of the worker. From equation (13) it is easy to derive
the following results for the choice of energy saving technology.
dTd
dxL
An increase in the energy tax will lead to the installation of better energy saving
technologies. Since an increase in the energy tax increases the expenditure for energy
it will make the installation of energy saving technologies more profitable. Also an
increase of the scrapping age T will lead to more, energy saving since there is more
time for the firm to recover the investment cost. A higher labor tax xL has a negative
impact on the choice of the energy saving technology. To understand this result better,
a look at equation (12) might be helpful. From the perspective of the firm a higher
labor tax has the same effect as an increase in the workers bargaining power.
Therefore, a higher labor tax will decrease the cash flow that results from an
20investment. This will lead the firm to reduce its investment cost, which results in the
choice of a less expensive energy saving technology.
The exit condition (5) can be transformed with the wage equation (10) to
Equations (12), (13), and (15). describe the equilibrium of the model. With the
redefinition of variables x = m(l; 8) and the help of (14), we have the following system
of equations, as is shown in. appendix C
(16b)
Equations (16a) and (16b) describe the steady state equilibrium of the economy. (16a)
gives the entry condition for firms and determines the scrapping age Td. (16b) gives
the exit condition and for a given value of x it can be used to calculate the exit age Td.
Usually one would expect that the relationship between x and Td in (16a) is increasing.
An increasing scrapping age Td should stimulate entry of firms, since there is more
time to recover the sunk cost. At the same time the relationship between Td and x in
(16b) is expected to be decreasing. This is so, because an increasing x raises the
opportunity cost for workers to stay with an old technology, since the probability of
finding a new job after quitting the old job increases. Hence, the wages paid by old
technologies should be increasing prompting earlier exit of firms i.e. decreasing
scrapping age. Differentiation of (16a) with respect to x and Td, however, gives
21Although intuition suggests that (dx/dTd)
m° should be positive, theoretically it is
possible that this relationship is negative. This is the case if an increasing T(l leads to
such a strong increase in the installation cost of energy saving technology that the gain
in the present value of the cash flow is overcompensated. Referring to the discussion
of equation (14), however, we know that a better energy saving technology is chosen
only, because there is more time to recover the increased investment cost. This means
in (17a) the negative effect is a direct consequence of the first effect. Therefore, it




Differentiation of (16b) with respect to x and Td, gives
(17b) ^ = ^ <0
Also here the counterintuitive case, a. positive value for {dTj/dx)' , is possible. As
was pointed out above an increasing x raises the opportunity cost of workers to stay
with old technologies, hence, old technologies have to pay a higher wage to prevent
workers from quitting their job. This effect will lead to a decrease in the scrapping age.
Old and new firms anticipate the increase in x and base their investment decision on
new expected lifetime Td. The new choice Td is based on three considerations. The
first effect origins from the fact that a new exit age is also connected to a new cash
flow at the date of exit. If the firms decide to extend Td they have to consider that
because of growth, the energy price and the wage will be higher. This effect is
reinforced by the fact that if old firms planned with a longer Td also new firms plan
with a longer Td. This leads to more investment into energy saving technology. The
22higher investment level of new firms makes their matches more valuable and,
therefore, increases the wage for old firms. Old firms however, also invested more into
energy saving technology. This effect increases the cash flow of old firms at the date
of exit. The investment decision of old firms might lead to a positive (dTd / d x)"'", if
the investment reaction is so strong that the cash flow of old firms, that originally
wanted to exit at a given date, becomes positive at that given date, so that they, choose
a later exit date. In what follows we assume that the impact on the investment decision
of the old firms is weaker than the other three effects. This assumption is satisfied for
sufficiently small values of a or B. Hence, we assume that {dxldTll)
cn"
> in (17a), is
positive and (dTj/dx)"" in (17b) is negative. These results can be presented in the
following diagram:
entry
Determination oi 7^ and x
Now only the equilibrium condition for unemployment has to be determined. In
equilibrium the flow into unemployment is equal to job destruction. Job destruction
equals the sum of the jobs that are hit by an exogenous shock and the number of jobs
that reach their scrapping age. Hence the flow into unemployment equals
5(1 -u) + m{\;%)ue~
m'
1. The flow out of unemployment equals job creation which is
um(l;0). In steady state equilibrium the flow into unemployment equals the flow out of
unemployment. Hence, with x = m(l," 0) we have in equilibrium
0») "= /.
 5_.r.N
23dff .. , du
— <0 and
dx dTd
With — < 0 and -^- < 0. Note that unemployment increases with decreasing Td. A
decreasing Trl means a faster job turnover, such that unemployment increases.
In the next sections we consider the effects of tax pobcy on exit, entry, energy demand
and unemployment.
3.5. Comparative static analysis
3.5.1. A labor tax increase







This expression gives the reaction of entry to an increase in the labor tax. There are
two opposing effects. First an increase in the labor tax is tantamount to a reduction of
the expected present value of an investment. This effect affects entry negatively. In
reaction to a labor tax increase firms also choose a less expensive energy saving
technology which reduces the cost of entry. This will have a positive effect on entry.
The second effect however is caused by the first effect. This can be seen clearly from
equation (.14). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the first effect is stronger
cnlrv I IT
than the second effect, hence —— I > 0, in order to prevent x from going to zero
which cannot be an equilibrium, since u would equal zero.
Differentiating the exit condition (16b) with respect to Td and xL yields
24_ V
dxL
There are two main opposing effects at work. The increase in the gross wage payments
of old firms certainly has a positive effect on an early exit age. But since an increase in
the labor tax also decreases investment expenditure of entering firms the values of the
new matches decrease. This will reduce the opportunity cost of workers to stay with
old technologies and hence represents a downward pressure on net wage payments of
existing firms. The effect that emerges from the existing firms' choice of another
technology, which raises the energy expenditure of the firm works in the same
direction as the first effect. Usually one would expect that after a labor tax increase the
gross wage payment of firms increase and from the assumption about the denominator
and the , it follows that the first effect that works in the direction of
—— decreasing the exit age is stronger than the second effect, hence
In the diagram the effects of a labor tax increase can be demonstrated as follows
25enlry
The cIlccLs of a labor tax increase
An increase in the labor tax unambiguously reduces the hiring unemployed ratio and
increases the destruction age of production units. This result might be surprising, since
the labor tax increase causes two effects on unemployment which are opposite in
direction.
du dx dTd




We have not been able to derive the sign of this expression generally. In appendix D




In numerical simulations we have not found any parameter constellation that leads to
less unemployment. Similar results are reported by Caballero, Hammour (1994).
3.5.2. An energy tax increase




From the discussion of (17a) we know that this expression is positive. An increase in
xE makes entry more expensive. In order to prevents from going to zero, we need
/ \ entry





Intuitively, one would guess that raising any tax would decrease the scrapping age,
because the cash flow of a match is reduced. In the case of the energy tax increase
there are three effects. An increase of the energy tax raises the energy expenditure of
existing firms and reduces the surplus. This leads to a faster arrival of the destruction
date. This effect will lead to an earlier exit of the firm. This effect is reinforced by the
second effect. The increased investment spending of new firms which make new
matches more valuable increases the workers opportunity cost to stay with an old
technology. The third effect results from the old firms change of behavior. The
increase in the energy tax leads the firms at the time when they had to decide over their
energy saving technology level also to an increased investment level. This had the
effect to reduce their energy expenditure. Only when this effect is stronger than the
two preceding effects, it is possible that the exit age increases as a consequence of an
increase in the energy tax. This would mean that the actual energy expenditure of old
27firms decreases after the tax raise. This would require an unrealistically high elasticity
dTd of energy demand. Therefore, we assume | —^- | < 0. From the last two expressions
we can derive the folloing diagram:
entry
The effects at'an energy lax increase
Also in the case of the energy tax increase the effects on unemployment are twofold
and opposite in direction. Therefore, it is important two find out which one of the two
opposing effects dominates. In appendix D, we show that a sufficient condition for a
. . du .




Also here we have not found any numerical example in which was negative.
dxE
28A conclusion that can be drawn from this and the last section is that an increase in the
energy tax and a decrease in the labor tax could be able to reduce unemployment.
Whether this will be the case depends on two important issues. First, which tax has a
stronger impact on unemployment and second, to which extent is the government able
to reduce the labor tax, if it has to consider its budget restriction.
3.6. Environmental tax reform
The question whether an environmental tax reform is able to yield an improvement of
environmental quality and at the same time to reduce unemployment can already be





The number of jobs at date t, with age a , /(«;()> equals the sum of hires Hit - a)
multiplied with the probability that no event has destroyed jobs that were created at
time t-a, e~
&". Therefore, energy demand can be rewritten in steady state, where
H(t - a) and \i(t - a) is the same for all vintages, as
(.9, Xfl
An increase in xE and a decrease in xL affect the steady state value of energy saving
technology in the same direction.- The direct effect of the tax changes on energy
demand leads to less energy consumption, since the tax reform stimulates investment
into energy saving technologies. Unclear are the effects of a tax reform on the steady
state values of A: and Td, since the proposed tax changes affect Td and x in opposite
directions. The increase in iE leads to a higher value of Td and a lower value of x. A
decrease in x, has the opposite effects. The extent of these two opposite effects
depends on the magnitude of the labor tax decrease relatively to the energy tax
increase. This magnitude in turn depends on the government's ability to use the
revenue created by an energy tax increase to cut the labor tax rate. The government's
29ability to cut the labor tax is largely determined by its budget restriction. Therefore, we
need to specify the government budget restriction. An exogenous level of government
expenditure gA(t) has to be financed each period through the revenue created from the
taxation of labor and energy. The revenue from the labor tax, which can be derived
with the help of the wage equation (10) equals
(20)
H(t - a)w(t - iva^dt, = ^ tf[A(t - a) - (
SA(r) ri;, (S+S,
+ (1+K) 8 + (l-e-^)x
 Jo'
The government budget restriction is




The assumption that the government expenditure grows at the steady state growth rate
g assures the existence of a steady state.
With the equations (16a), (16b) and (18)-(21) it is possible to determine the
equilibrium values of A', Td and x,, when g and xE are exogenous. In order to
determine the effects of an environmental tax reform, one has to calculate the
comparative statics with an exogenous change of xE in the equation system (16a),
(16b) and (18)-(21). Unfortunately, we were unable to determine the signs of the
effects in general. Therefore, we had to run some numerical examples. In all numerical
examples that we calculated with a linear investment function of the type /(ji) = co(i,
30we found that energy consumption of. firms. decreases. Hence, there is an
environmental benefit. We also found in all numerical examples that unemployment
increases slightly as a consequence of the environmental tax reform, although it is
possible to cut the labor tax.
0.12942
The etTecLs of an environmenuil tax reform on unemployment with parameters:
co=0.1; P = 0.5;p=0.01: g=0.0l; r=0.07; 5=0.01; 0=0.01; B=0.1; A'=3; g =0.29;
The results displayed in the diagram hold also for small values of g. Therefore, there is
no double dividend, when technological progress is destructive, although the effects on
unemployment are small. The economic intuition lies in what Bovenberg, de Mooij
(1994) call the tax base erosion effect. An increase in the energy tax causes increased
investment in energy saving technology which is a policy aim. The subsequent
decrease in energy consumption erodes the tax base of the energy tax and limits the
ability of the government to cut the labor tax sufficiently. The labor tax cut even
reinforces the tax base erosion effect, because the labor tax cut also leads to a decrease
in energy consumption. Therefore, if the government is restricted by its budget
constraint, it is impossible to compensate the firms sufficiently for the energy tax
increase if the compensation takes place in form of labor tax cuts. The increased tax
burden of the firms leads to less entry and more exit and as a consequence to more
unemployment.
All numerical examples mentioned in this paper were calculated with Mathematica 2.2. The file and the results
are available from the author on request.
314. The decentralized economy with neoclassical technological progress in the
long run
In the preceding section we made the extreme assumption that the cost of updating old
jobs with new technologies was high compared with the job creation cost such that
firms chose to keep a job open as long as it generated a positive cash flow and then
destroy it. This assumption resulted from the assumption of schumpeterian
technological progress. The alternative is to assume neoclassical technological
progress. At the other extreme is the assumption of zero implementation cost such that
existing jobs are continuously updated with the latest technology. The scrapping of an
old ptechnology is not connected anymore with reallocation of labor. Therefore, we
denote T with a subscript (' for implementation. Following Mortensen, Pissarides
(1995), we now consider the case where the updating cost or implementation cost
C + I{\i) is sufficiently low such that a firm always updates an existing job with the
latest technology. The implementation cost consists of the updating cost and the
investment cost in energy saving technology. We also assume that installation of the
latest technology always requires the choice of a new energy saving technology. This
assumption can be interpreted as that a certain energy saving technology that is
matched with a given technology is destroyed with the scrapping of an old technology
or incompatible with the new technology. We also show that there exists a unique level
of implementation cost C + /(|J.) where the decision of a firm to update switches to the
decision of destroying an existing job. In what follows, we assume that the installation
of energy saving technology causes the same costs as when the producion unit is
created and leave the interesting and possibly realistic extension of the case where the
installation of energy saving technology is different when a production unit is updated
open for future research.
324.1. The steady state equilibrium
Since most of the arguments of the preceding model can be applied also to the model
of this section we only sketch the new equations.
The value of a filled job with age a is
"
l) maxjj(t
+ /(H(« + T;j)i]
The variable T, reflects the scrapping age and the subscript i indicates that the
scrapping of an old technology is not connected to the destruction of the production
unit, but to the implementation of a new technology. The implementation date gives the
age that a job reaches before it is updated with the latest technology. Compared to
section 3, the value of a job includes only one additional term that reflects the fact that
the updating decision gives additional value to a job, because after scrapping the old
technology production continues with the new technology. This aspect is also reflected
in the value of a job for an employed worker
W(t;a) = [ ' w(t;s;\X.(.t))e *~





The value of a job is higher for a worker than in section 3, because after updating, his
share of the match suiplus increases due to the increased productivity level and the
possibly adjusted choice of the energy savings technology (J.
From equations (22) and (23) one can calculate the following steady state entry and
exit condition, as shown in appendix E:
C
(24a) -
33From the exit condition (24b) it can be seen that the scrapping age is smaller when the
firms update old jobs, i.e. T; <Td. This fact is reflected in the additional term
(r + b-g)
K, which was missing in (16b). This term represents the capitalization
effect. Since a firm has the chance to update existing jobs it does not have to cover the
installation cost with one installation only. Updating gives the firm the possibility to
allocate the installation cost over a much longer horizon and hence, effectively make
entry cheaper. Since the only kind of implementation cost that arises is in the form of
investment cost for the energy saving technology the entry condition (24a) gives us the
relationship between the implementation horizon 7] and the implementation cost
The firm chooses to implement, when the destruction horizon is at least as long as the
implementation horizon. Comparing (24a) with (16a) shows that because of




+s^ds > 0, implementation occurs only if
This is always the case if C<K. Therefore, the difference between the model of
section 3 and this section is that in section 3 we implicitly assumed that the updating
cost is higher than the setup cost for a new production unit.
With the same arguments and assumptions as in section 3, we can derive the following
diagram
34exit entry
Determination of 7) and x
The only equilibrium condition that is missing is the unemployment equation. Job
destruction equals the sum of the jobs that are hit by an exogenous shock. Hence the
flow into unemployment equals 6(1 -«). Scrapping does not influence unemployment
any longer, since it is assumed that old jobs are updated. The flow out of
unemployment equals job creation which is um(\;Q). In equilibrium the flow into





In the next sections we consider the effects of tax policy on exit, entry, energy demand
and unemployment.
4.2. Comparative static analysis
4.2.1. A labor tax increase
First we consider the effects of a labor tax change. Differentiation of (24a) with




The interpretation of section 3 applies also here. First an increase in the labor tax is
tantamount to a reduction of the expected present value of an investment. This effect
affects entry negatively. In reaction to a labor tax increase firms also choose a less
expensive energy saving technology which reduces the cost of entry. This will have a
positive effect on entry. The second effect however is caused by the first effect. This
can be seen clearly from equation (14). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that
the first effect is stronger than the second effect, hence
dxL
>0, in order to
prevent x from going to zero which cannot be an equilibrium, since u would equal
zero.
Differentiation of (24b) with respect to 7] and iL yields
SH)
3U
From the last two exressions we derive the following diagram:
36entry
exit
The CITCCLS ol* a labor tax increa.se
Since x decreases it is straightforward to see that, unemployment increases as a
consequence of a labor tax increase.
4.2.2. An energy tax increase






This is the same expression as in section 3, therefore, the same interpretation applies
here. From (24b) we can derive
<0
Also this expression is not new. Since an energy tax increase shifts the entry curve to
the right and the exit curve to the left, we can display the effects of an energy tax
increase in the following diagram
37entry
The el'I'ccLs of an energy lax increase
Also here the effects on unemployment are clear. Since Tt does not influence the
unemployment rale, unemployment will increase as a consequence of an energy tax
increase.
4.3. Environmental tax reform
We first explain the channels through which a revenue neutral tax reform that increases
xF and adjusts xL affects energy demand. In appendix F we show that aggregate
energy demand can be written as
(26)
An increase in the energy tax and a decrease in the labor tax have a positive effect on
the energy saving technology. Hence, energy consumption is reduced through this
channel. Unclear is the effect of the proposed tax reform on the variables x and Tt. An
increase in x raises the number of firms and hence, increases energy demand. Since at
the same time a higher value of x means less unemployment there is an objective
conflict operating through x in environmental tax reforms that have the aim of reducing
energy consumption and unemployment. If firms destroy old jobs after scrapping old
technologies this objective conflict also operates through 7J. If firms update old
technologies 7j has only the qualitative effect on energy demand working through (j..
Since the decision whether to update or not depends only on the sunk implementationcost, we have another reason why sunk cost might play an important role in the
evaluation of the cost of environmental policy.
The revenue from the labor tax can be written as
(27)
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The government budget restriction is
(28) gA(r) = T/,pAa)Hr) + xJ(|'/(f;a)H'O-a
Also here we were not able to derive general results. Therefore, also in this sectionwe
run numerical examples. Here, we found mixed results. A double dividend is possible,
if the labor tax is initially low and energy demand is inelastic, i. e. o is small.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
The effecls of an environmental tax reform on unemployment with parameters:
P=0.5;p=0.01; r=0.07; 8=0.01; fl=0.1;£=0.01, c0=0.1,C=0.5, ff=3, CT=0.01, g =0.001
Notice that the value for g is extremely small. A ceteris paribus increase to £=0.01





The effects of an environmental tax reform on unemployment
In all numerical examples we found a double dividend only for the case that the initial
labor tax, or equivalently g, is small.
5. Effects of an environmental tax reform in the short run
In this section we discuss the short term effects of an environmental tax reform. First
we.consider the case of destructive technological progress.
At each moment in time, exit is determined by
(29)
A{t - Td) - (1 + TE)p(t)Bv{t - 7;,)-° - (1 + XL)w{t - Td;Td;\x{t - 7») = 0
In order to derive equation (30) we solve the integral in equation (11) and
subsequently solve for the term $(xL)x(t)JA(t) and substitute this expression in the





- Td)~° - (30)
The first term on the left hand side describes the productivity advantage of the new
vintage to the oldest vintage currently in usage. The productivity advantage is always
positive due to technological progress. The second term describes the advantage of the
40new vintage in energy consumption to the exiting vintage. The right hand side
describes the installation cost of the new vintage.
In equilibrium the sum of the advantages has to equal the installation cost. Equation
(30) makes clear that it is not enough for the new vintage to be more productive and to
consume less energy than the oldest vintage. The advantages of the new vintage mug
be large enough to justify the installation cost of the new vintage. Equation (30) gives
the minimum, advantage that is necessary to justify the installation cost of the new
vintage. We consider an environmental tax reform that increases XF and decreases x;
in a revenue neutral way between t-Td and t. We assume that the scrapping age Td
remains constant for simplicity. The environmental tax reform has the following
effects:
After the energy tax xE increases, the new vintages are equipped with a better energy
saving technology so \x(t) increases. This raises the energy saving advantage of the
new vintage. At the same time the installation cost of the new vintage increases as
well. The first effect makes installation of the new vintage more profitable and the
second effect makes the new vintage less profitable. The larger the first effect and the
smaller the second effect the faster the replacement of the old vintage through the new
vintage.
The decrease in xr will increase the first and the second effect since also a decrease in
x, increases |i(f). In addition to these two effects the change in Tt also decreases
P(t;). This effect reduces the advantage of the new vintage, since it reduces the wage
payments not only of the new vintage but also of the old vintage. This will raise the
advantage that is necessary to justify the installation cost of the new vintage.
Since these effects are opposing in sign it is possible that the environmental tax reform
actually protects older production units from an earlier exit and prevents the new, more
energy saving, vintage from an earlier entry. Therefore, a decrease in xL might actually
insulate the old vintage from changes. Two effects are inevitable. An increase in \x(t)
41will always have two opposing effects, namely an increase in the advantage of the new
vintage and an increase in the installation cost of the new vintage. This effect is
necessary in order to decrease aggregate energy demand. The decrease in P(T;),
however, can be avoided, if instead of xL the installation cost of the new vintage is
reduced. E. g. a cut in K reduces the necessary advantage of the new vintage without
having any negative effects. A cut in I([i(t)) leads to a larger yi(t) and also increases
the advantage of the new vintage. At the same time both policies compensate for the
increase in installation cost.
Similar arguments will hold when technological progress is neoclassical. However, the
short term effects on unemployment are different in the creative destruction and the
neoclassical approach. In the model with creative destruction early exit of an old
vintage also means more unemployment, while in the neoclassical model exit of the old
vintage has no consequences for unemployment. In the model of creative destruction
there is a short term trade off between energy saving and unemployment. A cut of the
labor tax might compensate the negative effects short term effects on unemployment
caused by an energy tax increase. But this will happen at the cost of a smaller
environmental effect. In the short term it might be even possible that no reaction will
take place after the environmental tax reform since the advantage of the new vintage
does not justify its installation cost. In this case only in the long term will the
environmental tax reform lead to less energy consumption of the production sector.
6. Conclusions
A government that wants to reduce energy input and reduce unemployment at the same
time can only mean to prompt installation of new technologies and to avoid that
implementation of new technologies leads to job destruction. An environmental tax
reform that increases the energy tax and adjusts the labor tax in a revenue neutral way
might have the desired effects if the updating cost of old production units and the
initial tax on labor are sufficiently small. However, in numerical examples we found
42only very small decreases of unemployment. For reasonable parameter values we
found that unemployment slightly increases in both benchmark models in the long run.
We conclude from this that policymakers cannot expect an environmental tax reform,
as specified above, to reduce unemployment, i.e. to yield a double dividend.
Another result is that in the short run the described environmental tax reform might
slow down the installation of new technologies and help to keep alive old production
units with high energy demand. This is so, because also old production units benefit
from the labor tax cuts. This increases the necessary advantage in productivity and
energy efficiency to justify their installation or updating cost. This insulation effect of
old production units can be avoided if instead of the labor tax the installation cost of
new production units or the updating cost of old production units are reduced. In this
case the installation of more energy saving technologies would take place at a faster
pace. In the case of creative destruction this would lead to more unemployment in the
short run. Reducing the updating cost might also cause a switch for some production
units from the first benchmark model to the second benchmark model. In the first
benchmark model the unemployment rate is always higher than in the second
benchmark model. A switch from the first to the second benchmark model might also
cut the unemployment level. This switch could be achieved through a decrease in the
updating cost, In this case technological progress might loose its destructive effects.
Therefore, a government should make updating possible for as many production units
as possible through a cut in the updating and installation cost.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we derive the wage equation. Differentiating (4) with respect to a
gives
Ja(t;a;\i(t)) = -[A(f) -(1 + T£)p(a)fln(f)-
0 -(1 + xL)w(t;a;\i(t))]
+(r + b)J(t;a:\i(t))
Differentiating (7) and (8) with respect to a gives
' (32) Wa(t;a) = -[w(t;a;\L(t)) + W(t + a)] + (r + 8)W(t;a)
The value of being unemployed equals
(33) Ua (t + a) = -[m(l; 0) W(t + a)] + (r + m{\; 6))f/(f + a)
From these three equations we obtain the following two equations
(r + S)J(t; a; \i(i)) = [A(t) - (l + xE)p(a)B\x(ty
a - (l + XL)w(t;a; (i(r))]
+Ja(l;a;\Ji(t))
46and
Inserting the equations into
(9) (1 - p)( W(t; a) - U{t + a)) = $J{t; a;
where we consider equation (10) gives:
(1 - p)(w(/;a; u(f)) - m(\;Q){W(t + a) - U(t + a))) =
P([>1(/) - (1 + x^p(a)B\i{t)-" - (1 + XL)w{t;a;
Solving for w(t; a; ji(f)) gives
^{\ + TE)p{a)B\i{t)-
a]
- (3)w(l; 6)(W(f + a) - t/(f + a))
Substituting (9) yields
^ J
P fl;0,^(r + a))
Appendix B
In this appendix we derive equation (11). Inserting equation (5) into (4) gives for a=0:
J(t;O;\*t)) = £""[(! + xt)
(34)













+(1 + T7>(f; r,;
Solving
(5) A(/)




Now we derive equation (13). From (10) follows




(13) Iv = f'(l - p)CT(i
Appendix C
Inserting the exit condition in steady state form
• (15)
into the entry condition
(12) J =
gives





























































The expressions — and can be rearranged with the help of —- and —
L'- to












Differentiating the unemployment equation (18) with respect to t, and x£, respectively
yields











From these last two expressions we can see that a sufficient condition for a negative
effect of the labor tax and energy tax, respectively on unemployment,
+ <T
8T/'x < 0. are the same.
dTd
Appendix E
The optimal investment decision in energy saving technology is determined as in
section 3. Therefore, condition (13) is also valid in section 4 and we can drop the
notation max. The wage equation which does not change can be calculated
analogously to the preceding section. Inserting the wage equation (10) into (22) gives
53(36)
and in steady state with constant 9 and
(37)
-(1 +xE)p(s)B[i(t) "
7J;0;,i(0) - A(t + 7j)[c + /(ji
with J = [K
Under consideration of
_ ,rrtf)J!
equation (37) can be rearranged to
(38).
From (38) we derive the following steady state exit condition




Aggregate energy demand is
'i',
\ -aT° f{a;t)da
with f{a;t) describing the number of firms employing at date t a technology of age a.
f{a;t) equals the number of hires at date t-a plus the number of firms that had at date
t-a a technology of scrapping age 7):
f(a;t) = H{t - a)e"
6
u + f{T,;l - a)e
&"
where
f{T,;t - a) =H{t-a- T^ + /(?;,•* - a - T.y
iT<
Hence, f(a; t) can be expressed as
If the economy has been in a steady state for a long time, we can approximate the
number of hires that have been done out of steady state through the steady state value
H{t-a). Since these values are discounted with <?~
8n/\ the differences are negligibly
small. Hence,
f(a;t) = e-s-Hit - a)^'
81* =
 C ff(* - a)
(\-e •)
Therefore, steady state energy demand is
55Substituting H = xu = , we get
5 + x
(26)
56